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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF
lJ'l1AH, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
EZRA C. LUNDAHL, INC., E. CORDELL LUNDAHL, SHRYLEEN B.
LUNDAHL, EZRA C. LUNDAHL and
LEA'l1HA A. LUNDAHL,
Defendants and Appellants.

Civil
No.
11359

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Plaintiff-Respondent petitions the above-entitled
Court pursuant to Rule 76( e) (1), U. R. C. P., for a rehearing in the above entitled matter on the decision of
this Court filed May 20, 1969, upon the following points
wherein it is alleged that the Court has erred:
POINT I: The Supreme Court in basing its decision holding the bank had lost its right to charge back
on Section 70A-4-212(1) and the jury finding that the
bank was negligent, failed to consider and pass on the
effect of Section 70A-4-21.2( 4) that the bank's right to
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charge back is not affected by failure of the bank to
exercise ordinary care, and the official comment thereto that irrespective of the cause of the non-payment
and of the person ultimately liable for non-payment.
charge back is pennitted, even where non-payment results from the bank's negligence, the remedy being in
damages.
POINT II: The Supreme Court in passing on the
fullness of the accord and satisfaction misconstrued
Lundahl' s position and testimony, holding that it included "the obligatiMi in controversy," when actually
Lundahl maintained throughout the trial and in their
brief to this Court (page 5 of Appellant's Brief) that
the fact that the $8,100.00 check was unpaid was not
known by the Lundahls, and the settled law appears to
be that an accord and satisfaction can cover only items
on wh1'ch there is a meeting of the minds.

STATEMEN'l' OF THFJ NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a Petition for rehearing filed by Plaintiffrespon<lent on a decision of the Supreme Court filed
May 20, 1969.

DISPOSITION IN PRIOR DECISION
In its May 20, 1969 decision, the Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the lower court in Plaintiff's
favor an<l affirmed the judgment of the lower court
in Defendant 'R favor.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks a rehearing on the decision of .May 20, 1%9, and an ultimate affirmance of
tliP lower court's judgment.
STATE~fE~NT

OF FACTS

No restatement ot' the facts is necessary, except to
point up again that the Lundahls maintained in their
testimony during trial and in their brief on appeal that
they were not aware that the $8,100.00 check (the one
in eontroversy) had 110t Leen paid until sometime in
F'ehruary, 19G7, which was about six weeks after the
accord and satisfaction on January 4, 1967, which the
Supreme Court held in its decision settled and compromised ''all accounts'' between Lundahl and the Bank.

STA1'I<JMENT OF POINTS
POINT I: The Suvreme Court, in basing its decision holding the bank had lost its right to charge back
on Section 70A-4-2L2(1) and the jury finding that the
bank was negligent, failed to consider and pass on the
effect of Section 70A-4-2L2( 4) that the bank's right to
d1ar_r;e back is not affected by failure of the bank to e.r-

ercise ordinary care, and the official comment thereto
that irrespective of the cause of the non-payment and
of tlie verson ultimately liable for non-payment, charge
back is permitted, even where non-payment results from
tl1t' bank's negligence, tlie remedy being in damages.
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POINT lI: The Supreme Cou,rt in passing on the
fullness of the accord and satisfaction misconstrued
Lundahl's position and testimony, holding that it included "the obligation in controversy," when actually
Lundahl maintained throughout the trial and in their
brief to this Court (page 5 of Appellant's Brief) that
the fact that the $8,100.00 check was unpaid was not
known by the Lundahls, and the settled law appears
to be that an accord and satisfaction can cover only
items on which there is a meeting of the minds.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
The Supreme Court, in basing its decision holding
the bank had lost its right to charge back on Section
70A-4-2L2(1) and the jury finding that the bank was
negligent, failed to consider and pass on the effect of
Section 70A-4-212(4) that the bank's right to charge
back is not affected by failure of the bank to exercise
ordinary care, and the official comment thereto that
Irrespective of the cause of the non-payment and of the
person 'ultimately liable for non-payment, charge back
is permitted, even where non-payment results from the
bank's negligence, the remedy being in damages.
Thjs Court, in holding that the bank had lost its
right to charge haek the Lundahl account and was at
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~uid time no longer an agent for its depositor, Lundahl,
~tnted:

"However, this (the agency) presupposes that the
hank acts in accordance with its duty imposed by
law: and thi8 requires presentation to the payor
bank in the due course of business, and if the check
is dishonored, notice to its depositor by its midnight
deadline or within a longer reasonable time under
tlie circumstances. Sec. 70A-4-212(1), U. C. A., 1953.
If tht>re is a substantial failure of the bank to perform this duty, it loses its right of charge-back.
See. 70A-4-212, U. C. A., 1953.
r:rhis Court then recites the jury finding that the
bank was negligent in failing to give notice.
Petitioner asserts that this Court has done some
8elective application of a portion of Section 70A-4-212,
resulting in an unwarranted exclusion of other equally
important portions of said Section.
rrhis Court singles out and applies subsection (1)
of 70A-4-212. It apparently has inadvertently failed to
consider, or if considered, for some reason failed to
comment nn, sub8ection ( 4) which plainly states:
"The right to charge back is not affected by
(a) Prior use of the credit given for the item; or
(h) Failure of the bank to exercise ordinary care
with respect to the item, but any bank so failing
remains liable.''
This seems to state unequivocably that negligence
does not prevent or preclude charge-back, nor cause the
hank to lose its right to charge back.
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The question then anses, what does the bank remain liable for?
This is answered m the comments to the Section
from the 1962 official text of the National ConferencP
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws:
Comment 5: "The rule of subsection ( 4) relating
to c1iarge-back (as distinguished from claim for
refund) applies irrespective of the cause of the nonpayment, and of the person ultimately liable for nonpayment. Thus, charge-back is permitted even where
non-payment results from the depositary bank's own
nPrrli gence.
Any other rule would result in litigation based '
upon a claim for wrongful dishonor of other checks
of the customer, with potential damages far in exces8 of the amount of the item. Any other rule
would require a bank to determine difficult questions of fact. The customer's protection is found
in ~he general obligation of good faith (Sections
1-203 and 4-103). ff bad faith is established the
customer's recovery "includes other damages, if
am, suffered by the party as a proximate consequence." (Section 4-103 (5) ; see also Section 4-402). ''
Section 4-103(5) cited above, (which is 70A-4-103
(fl) U.

r.

A. 19[)3) provides for the computation of damages against a party who has failed to use ordinarv
care in hanclling an item.
This suhse(•tion provides:
( 5) The measure of damages for failure to exercise onhnan- care in handling an item is the amount
of the it01~1 ·rNlnced b~- an amount which could not
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have been realized by the use of ordinary care, and
where there is had faith it includes other damages,
if any, suffered by the party as a proximate consequence.
The question o t' the amount of damages to Lundahl
was suhmitted to the jury by the lower court, along
with the question of due care, in question Number 3,
as follows:

''If you make a finding in answer to the previous
question, then here consider the question of damage
and award the Defendant such damage, if any you
find, as vvas proximately caused by the Plaintiff's
om1ssion, if anv you find."
Thf' jury ans·wcred:
"\Ve, the jury, find the amount of $893.93 which
was taken by the bank from the account of Lundahl.:;;,
Inc to be awarded to the Defendants.''

It is the bank's position that the bank, as Plaintiff,
specific~lly, and the banking industry, as an important
element of our society, in general, is entitled to have a
full interpretation of the applicable portions of the new
commercial code given them by this Court.
Of paramount importance is the question as to whe
ther subsection (1) of 70A-4-212 is exclusively applicable, or whether or not subsection ( 4) has some applicabilit~v, and if not, why not, and if so, to what extent.
If subsection ( 4) is of equal dignity with subsec-

tion (1), then the Lundahls remedy is in damages under
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Section 70A-4-103(5). The Jury found these damage,

to he $893.93.
rnrns. if as Suhsection ( 4) clearly says, the bank\
failure to exercise ordinary care does not affect its right
to charge-back the item, bnt leaves it liable for damages,
the banh was entitled to charge-hack the item of $8,100.00
and respond in damages for its failure to exercise ordinary care, in the sum of $893.93, as fixed by the jury.
rr1his is exactly what the lower court did.
Petitioner calls the Court's attention to the portion
of its di:>cision which states:
'' R:1t when a party has demanded a trial by jury
he is entitled to have the jury find the facts, and
it is not the trial court's prerogative to make findings inconsistent therewith and thereby defeat the
effect of the jury's findings.''
Pe6tioner respectfully submits that this rule should
apply to all of the jury's findings, including the finding
on the amount of damages suffered by Lundahls, because the effect of this Court's decision in selectively
applyinf only subsection (1) of 70A-4-212 to this case
and sidestPpping- subsection ( 4) thereof, is to make a
finding that Lundahl suffered damages of $8,100.00 by
the bank's failure to exercise ordinary care, whereas the
jury found these damages to he only $893.93.
Petitioner fortlier points out that this Court's de-
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mswn emphatically pointed up the jury's findings of
net','liger1te and on accord and satisfaction, questions 1,
2 aud 4 and the am;wers thereto, all being favorable to
Lundahl, hut did not in any respect even mention
question 3 and its answer, which was not favorable to
Lundahl. rrhe inviolate position afforded by this Court
with respect to three of the jury's answers should also
be afforded to the answer to question three, and it is
respectfully suggested that this Court should not ignore it nor modify it.
The Uniform Commercial Code is now in the same
position as was the Uniform Negotiable Instrument law
about a half century ago. Court interpretations of the
law are_ in Petitioner's opinion, not only of vital importancP to the specific litigants involved, but to the
commercial world in general. Petitioner thinks that
attorneys. bankers, educators, judges and businessmen
everywhere are interested in cases, wherever decided,
interpreting the code. These interpretations over the
years certainly will be of benefit as guides for future
conduct of business and in commercial transactions involving the code. These benefits, it would seem, warrant
a close scrutiny of the language of the code and a determination of its applicability.
Specifically, if Subsection ( 4) of 70A-4-212 does
not mean what it says and should not be read in conjunction with the other provisions of 212, Petitioner
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asserts that reat'on should be given for such isolation.
And, if Subsection ( 4) is applicable, and the dE~
positor 's remedy is in damage:-; for the bank's fai]mp
to use urdinary care, then Petitioner claims the benefit
of it, and since the ;jnr.\· has spoken on the amount of
damage involved, this amount should be accepted bi·
this court and not modified.
ARGUMENT
POINT II

Tlu; Supreme Court in passing on the fullness of
the accord and satisfaction niisconstrued Lundal1l's
position and testimony, holding that it included "the
obligation in controversy," when actually Lundahl maintained throughout the trial and in their brief to this
Court (page 5 of Appellant's Brief) that the fact that
the $8,100.no check was unpaid u1as not known by the
Liindahls, and tlie settled law appears to be that an
accord and satisfaction can cover only items on which
tliere is a meeti11_q of the minds.
This Court apparently construed Lundahl 's position and testimony to be that the accord and satisfaction of .J annal',\' 4, 1967, included the obligation in controversy.
Actuall,\·, if Petitioner reads the Lundahl testimony
(Tr. 105) and contention made in their Appellant's
Brief, page ;), rorrectly it is their position that they
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did not know the item involved was unpaid at the time
of the accord and satisfaction.
If Lundahl 's testimony and contention is accepted
by this Court, that they were unaware of the outstanding item at the time of the January 4, 1967 accord and

:satisfaction, and if this Court holds to its decision that
the accord and satisfaction covered the ''unknown'' item,
the law in £Ttah would appear to be that an accord and
satisfaction requires no meeting of the minds on the
suhject matter, but is more in the nature of a release
of all claims, known or unknown.
This certainly would be contrary to established law
on the subject.
The accord in an :i,greement. Fairchild vs. Mathews,
(Idaho. 1966) 415 P ( 2d) 43.
The general essentials of accord are set forth in 1
Am. Jur. (2d), Accord and Satisfaction Section 4, page
:304 as follows:
The discharge of claims by way of accord and satisfaction is dependent upon a contract express or implied; there can be no accord and satisfaction without making of a new contract, one independent of
and additional to the source, contractual or otherwise, of the disputed claim or claims. The essentials to a valid contract generally must be present.
It must appear that there is a proper subject matter,
that the parties thereto were competent to contract with each other, that there was consent or a
met=>ting of the minds of the parties, and that the
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agreement was supported by a sufficient consideration. A claim is not discharged if the purporter!
accord and satisfaction violates the law.
Without belaboring the point, it is most difficult
to understand how an accord can cover an unknown
item.

CONCLUSION
Pe6tioner respectfully asks this Court to grant a
rehearing in this matter, and upon such rehearing,
affirm the judgment of the trial court, or in the alternative, if this Court feels that the case as now presented
is cluttered up with too many extraneous facts, to grant
a new trial with limitations or instructions as to the
scope thereof.

OLSON & HOGGAN
By-------------------------------·-··-----------------··-···
Charles P. Olson

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
BY---------------------------------------------------------·
Don B. Allen
Attorneys for Petitioner

